Empirical results show that unemployment benefits (UB) recipients significantly change to worse job conditions with respect to wages and firm size, but change to better job conditions with respect to occupation, position, industry, and residence. While the effects for occupation are not significant, UB recipients have a significant tendency to stay the same. In other words, results of other conditions imply that they reduce the reservation wage to get better conditions with respect to occupation, industry and residence. This means strong inertia in these aspects. JEL Classifications: J63, J64, J65
Introduction
The unemployment rate in Japan has been rising rapidly since the 1990s and it is more than 5% after 2000. The official Labour White Paper of the Japanese Ministry of Labour in 1999 indicated that the structural and frictional unemployment rate was more than 3%, and that economic policy to counter recession could not solve this high unemployment problem, at least in the short term. Except in 1998 and 1999 when the Netherlands and the USA respectively achieved lower unemployment rates, Japan has enjoyed the lowest unemployment rate among OECD countries. In the recent period of high unemployment in Japan, the scarecity of the Employment Insurance System 1) have been remarkable, as this was based on the previous long-term low unemployment rate. This paper focuses on the unemployment benefits (UB) among several aspects of the Employment Insurance System, and examines its effects on the search behaviour of the unemployed 2) .
Many investigations evaluate the UB effect on the behaviour of the unemployed. The elasticities of UB levels with respect to unemployment duration have been estimated to be about 0.28-0.36 in the UK (Narendrannathan, Nickell and Stern (1985) ) and about 0.36 in the USA. While simple international comparisons can be misleading because of different UB systems and backgrounds 3) , these imply that the unemployment period is extended by half a week if the UB level increases by 10% (Moffitt (1985) ) 4) . On the other hand, the effect of potential UB duration on unemployment duration is larger. Katz and Meyer (1990) predicts that this elasticity is twice as large as that of the UB level. Christofields and McKenna (1995) also finds that the hiring rate significantly increases in the last month of the UB period in Canada. Similar patterns are confirmed in Japan (Tachibanaki (1984) ).
Moreover, Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) finds that the replacement rate effect on wage gains is limited: It is significant for females but not for males. Overall, these studies indicate some evidence of moral hazard in the UB recipient's behaviour.
However, even if the UB extends the duration of unemployment, it may not directry 1 imply the precense of the moral hazard. As the UB loosens the budget constraint of its recipients unambiguously, it should extend the duration of unemployment. The problem is whether the recipients decrease their intensity of search behaviour rather than increasing in their duration of unemployment. Even with the extended unemployed duration, if they do not lower the intensity of their search behaviour, they will receive good conditions in their new jobs and this longer unemployed duration should not be judged to be as a moral hazard. Therefore, programme evaluation for UB should be measured by the conditions of the new jobs in comparison with those of previous jobs rather than by examining the duration of unemployment or the unemployment rate.
To investigate this argument, the author attempts to incorporate conditions in the new job with exogenous UB receipt in Ohkusa (2000a) and with endogenous UB receipt in Ohkusa (2000b) . This paper analyze this problem as a program evaluation to UB as in Todd (1997, 1998) . Of course, UB receipt is not completely a self-selection. However, if we consider what jobs they had chosen previously or when and what jobs they change to, ineligibility for UB itself seems to be endogenous. Moreover, the method of Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, 1998) does not necessarily require complete endogenous self-selection about whether they select to join the programme or not. It only requires that the distribution of variances should overlap among programme participants and non-participants. Therefore, it does not seem to be irrelevant to use such a method to evaluate the UB, although it is somewhat an extreme viewpoint.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the data in detail. Section 3, then, describes the model to be estimated, and the results are shown in Section 4. In Section 5, the results of the small data set are shown for a deeper evaluation. Finally, the results are summarized and suggestions for further research are mentioned.
Data
The following analysis uses micro-data from the Survey of Job Changers (Tenshokusha Sougou Jittai Chosa (in Japanese) conducted in 1998 by the Ministry of Labour. This survey contains detailed information, including characteristics of individuals, the conditions of previous and current jobs, unemployment benefits, and the unemployment duration of 10,000 regular workers. The surveyed workers had the following three characteristics:
• They were hired in the past 12 months.
• They had worked in another firm in the past 12 months before they were hired in the current firm.
• They are regular workers.
The feature of this survey is that the conditions (including wages, occupation, rank, industry, and firm size) of both the previous job and the current job are available. Information on whether they changed their place of residence due to job hunting is also available. Thus any change in working conditions is easily measured. Because the main purpose of this paper is to test the UB effect, those individuals in the sample who had not experienced unemployment are excluded from the following analysis.
These data automatically show that the unemployed who does not obey the rule of UB receipt. For example, many persons seem to be eligible for UB receipt by the observable data, in terms of age, tenure, occupation, and firm size in the previous job, and the reason for the turnover, but they do not necessarily enjoy UB. In fact, this proportion is about 50%. The reason they forfeited their eligibility cannot be seen directly because we have no information on their eligibility. However, we can judge that the unemployed decide endogenously whether or not to apply their eligibility. Of course, many people are ineligible because of their previous jobs. In this sense, their eligibility was determined when they got their previous job, and therefore, it seems to be predetermined for their current 3 unemployment. But if their characteristics, such as age, education level, skills etc., heavily affect the conditions of the previous job, the UB eligibility determined by the previous job also seems to be endogenous. Thus, it is obvious that whether or not they are receiving UB reflects, at least partly, the decision of the unemployed, and thus we should acknowledge this endogeneity and take it into account.
The sample size, which includes those who had less than one month unemployed period, is 7370. The summary statistics are shown in Table 1 and 0 otherwise. This is because experiences in the previous job is more useful in the same occupation (industry) than in another. Concerning residence, the index is defined to be 1 if they experience a changes in residence due to searching for a new job, and 0 otherwise.
Needless to say, changing residence implies a bad condition. Note that "better conditions" refers to a defined lower value in spite of a larger value in wages, firm size and rank.
The Testing Hypothesis
The testable hypothesis is simply whether the UB reduces intensity of job search. The main problem with testing this is that intensity of search cannot directly be observed. If intensity of search could be observed, there would be no room for moral hazard. Thus, it has to be investigated indirectly in the following manner.
As the UB reduces the budget constraints of the recipients and reduces the disutility from the extended duration of unemployment, the duration of unemployment by recipients should increase unambiguously. If there is no moral hazard, the recipients seek a job with better conditions. Conversely, because non-recipients cannot enjoy sucu a benefit, they may accept a job with worse conditions so as to shorten the duration of unemployment.
Therefore, the recipients should be able to get better jobs than the non-recipients.
If there is moral hazard, then, as the recipients decrease their intensity of search, the difference between the new job conditions for recipients and non-recipients decreases in comparison with the no moral hazard case. In the extreme case, if there is no difference between the new job conditions for recipients and non-recipients, the intensity of search would have been greatly reduced to cancel out any effect of extended unemployment duration. In the worst case, if the conditions in the new job for recipients are worse than for non-recipients, there is strong evidence of moral hazard.
Therefore, controlling for the endogeneity of UB receipt and unemployment duration, moral hazard is defined as the change in conditions between a previous and current job which characterises the outcome of search behaviour, .
The Empirical Model
In the case of the endogeneity of UB recipients, the effect of the UB on the effort of job search and/or for better conditions of new jobs could be recognized as a measure for the programming evaluation. The gold standard for programme evaluation is the randomized experiment, used in fields such as medicine and natural science in which other conditions can be controled properly. However, in the field of economics, because such randomized experiments need considerable time and money, and have serious ethical problems, it is very difficult to utilize them.
If we cannot perform a randomized experiment, the programme evaluation needs to be by the analysis of observational data where programme participation is selected endogenously.
In this case, the propensity score method (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) ) was used in the Let the subscript i denote for programme participants and j for non-participants, and define the characteristic of these two groups as X i and X j , the outcome of the programme as Y i and Y j , and the estimated probability of the first step estimation for programme participation as P (X i ) and P (X j ), respectively. In this case, the programme evaluation is summarized by the following statistics
where
is a kernel function such as the Biweight kernel, which is widely used (Silverman (1992),Todd, Behrman and Cheng (2000)); and h is bandwidth and its optimal value is
is the standard deviation of P (X j ). This method is called Kernel Matching.
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Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) suggest the local linear matching rather than Kernel
Matching because of its efficiency. local linear matching method evaluates the programme according to the following statistics.
The subscript k means the summation among the programme participants only. Both methods evaluate the programme according to the average treatment effect 5) .
It is obvious that these statistics do not specify their distributions, and therefore, restrictive assumptions should be avoided. Thus, its confidence interval is calculated by bootstrapping procedures, as outlined by Todd, Behrman and Cheng (2000), in which the bias is corrected (Efron and Tibshirani (1998)). The number of replications is 1000.
The first step is the probit estimation for UB receipt. The dependent variable r i is 1 if the ith unemployed person enjoys UB and 0 otherwise. The estimation equation is
where Z i is the vector of the information about the ith unemployed and their previous jobs, and W i includes the duration of the on-the-job search and the dummy for whether they voluntarily quit or not.
In particular, Z i includes: gender, the cubic function of age and tenure, education level, occupation, position, industry, scale of firm, a dummy for any licenses, a dummy for regular workers, and regional dummies. Needless to say, tenure, occupation, position, industry, a dummy for regular workers, and scale of firm apply to the previous job.
Tenure, a dummy for regular workers, industry, and firm scale determine UB eligibility. Other variables in Z i affect UB receipt through the conditions of the previous job.
Moreover, in the case of voluntary quitting, eligibility is prolonged for three months. The duration of the on-the-job search implies heterogeneity in the preparation for job search before unemployment.
Needless to say, the goodness of fit in this first step is the most important for the propensity score method. Hence, a more extended specification, which includes the interaction terms of gender, age, on-the-job search, and the voluntary quitting dummy, is estimated in the first step to check its robustness.
Empirical Results
The empirical results for UB receipt are shown in Table 2 .
It means that the unemployed who is older, less tenured (but its effect decreasing), vocational school or two years college graduates compared with junior high school graduates, and has longer OTJ search is likely enjoy UB recipients.
Moreover, the unemployed who worked as regular worker, and whose previous job was manager, officials, or clerical comparison with profesional or technical worker in occupation, specialist or routine worker comparison with executive in position also have higher probability of being UB recipient.
Conversely, the unemployed whose previous occupation was other worker compared with profesional or technical worker, who quit voluntary 5) , and who was employed at small firm which employees less than 30, tend to have lower probability of being UB recipient.
Note the effects the duration of the on-the-job search and the voluntary quitting dummy.
These marginal effects means that the probability of UB receipt increase by 0.6% point due to every one month longer in OTC job search, and voluntary quitter are suffered 4.2% lower probability.
On the other hand, regular workers in previous jobs, significantly enjoy the 20% point higher receipt of UB, which reflects institutional background.
8 Next, the empirical results for average treatment effects are summarized in Table 3 , which includes four panels-whether simple, included the interaction terms in the first step, whether kernel matching or local linear matching were involved. Note that a positive average treatment effect means that receipt of UB helps individuals enjoy better jobs with respect to wages, firm scale, and ranks. Conversely, a negative average treatment effect means that receipt of UB helps individuals enjoy better jobs with respect to occupation, industry, and residence.
Four panels in the table share common results. Namely, UB with worse job conditions with respect to wage and firm scale and, conversely, UB with better conditions with respect to rank, residence and industries. However, industries is not significant in Kernel Matching.
Not all panels about occupation show significant effects. The effects are not significant in kernel matching, but in local linear matching UB helps recipients get better jobs.
Results for wages and residence are the same, but there are some inconsistencies with finds that UB worsens job conditions but our results are not significant. Tables 4 to 11 show the empirical results of the sample data split according to their characteristics: namely, Table 4 contains the results for those who experienced unemployment for more than one or three month(s); Table 5 for those whose age is more or less than 45; Table 6 for those who were employed in firms in the previous job with more or fewer than 100 employees; and Table 7 for those who were regular or not regular workers in their previous jobs. The values, of 45 years old and 100 employees, are chosen so as to split the sample almost by half.
Empirical Results for the Split Samples
Splitting the sample by unemployment duration is for the sake of excluding miss-reporting and to clarify the differences between eligibility and receipt of UB. Whether or not the unemployed were regular workers in their previous jobs may also heavily affect eligibility for UB. The split by age can demonstrate the effect of age discrimination in the hiring of workers in Japan, which has become an important social issue. The split by previous firm size also can capture mobility of workers in changing jobs according to firm size.
All tables share the same features and are consistent with Table 3 . In particular, the wage reduction due to UB receipt is very clear, and UB encourages good jobs in the sense of rank or residence except for irregular workers in previous jobs. On the other hand, there are some counter-intuitive results. For example, in Tables 4, the differences between UB recipients and non-recipients are larger in the sample of those whose unemployment duration is more than one month than those in the sample whose unemployment duration is more than three months, namely -.11 vs -.10 in Kernel matching or-.12 vs -.11 in local linear matching. Thus, it seems that longer unemployment duration reduces wages in new jobs as much as UB receipt does, athough such a difference is not significant.
Concerning occupation, most estimates are not significant except in Table 5 and the Local Linear Matching case in Table 4 . On the other hand, UB encourages staying in the same industry, regardless of the unemployment duration, for those who were older than 45 and employed in previous jobs in firms with less than 100 employees, but these are insignificant in other cases. Moreover, UB encourages individuals to move to smaller firms for the same group of the unemployed (and regular worker in previous jobs).
In summary, the effect of UB on wages, rank and residence are confirmed to be robust, even if the sample is split. The most interesting case is irregular workers in previous jobs, indicated in Table 7 . They do not suffer from UB receipts, except for wages. Since regular workers share the all tendencies in Table 3 , inertia in residence due to UB is specified only for regular workers.
Concluding Remarks
This paper examines how the UB affects intensity or search efforts of the unemployed, measured by the working conditions of new jobs, being the outcome of search behaviour, taking into account of the endogeneity of UB receipts by using a Nonparametric Propensity Score Matching Method.
Empirical results show that the UB recipients significantly change to worse job conditions in terms of wages and firm size, but change to better job conditions with respect to occupation, position, industry, and residence. While the effect for occupation is not significant, UB recipients have a significant tendency not to change. In other words, the results of other conditions imply that they reduce the reservation wage so as to get better conditions with respect to occupation, industry, and residence. This implies that there is strong inertia in these aspects.
This paper focuses on programme evaluation for UB at the individual level. Needless to say, individual should maximize their utility under their given condition. However, if our interest extended to the social efficiency, individual maximizing behavior does not necessariy yields social efficiency. In the case of UB system, such inertia would imply social inefficiency in the sense of misallocation or discourage the movement in labor.
Policy implication from this research is obvious. Since UB discourage labor movement in the sense of industry or region, the system of UB should be reform to penalize such a inertia or encourage to move. To do so, UB should pay additionally if the unemployed decide to move, or the unemployed ought to apply to at least one firm within a week like in the U.S.A. These reform should rise intensity of job search, shorten the duration of unemployment, and then the total payment might be reduced. It means to rise social efficiency by reducing individual moral hazard, even though moral hazard is not analyzed in the main text.
Finally, we make some remarks about further research. First of all, the sample in this paper excludes those who are non-regular workers and not currently in the labour force.
Because outflows to non-regular workers in the labour market and outflows to the outside labour market are very important aspects of the unemployment situation and the functioning of the UB, it is necessary to consider this effect in evaluation of the UB scheme.
Secondly, further research should control for the omitted variables in this analysis, such as household assets, income from other members of the household, and household structure, which are not available in this data set.
Moreover, to evaluate more directly the inertia in required wages, occupation, etc., a panel analysis of the effects of these variables on unemployment duration would be very important. 2) Yashiro and Futagami (1998) discusses aspects of the Employment Insurance System other than UB.
3) Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) is a good survey of this field.
4)
Recently, Kohara (2000) has analyzed this issue by using micro data.
5) The word "treatment effect" is very common in applied econometric analysis as appeared in Greene(2000) and it means how endogenous choice (such as education attainment) affect outcome (such as wage or income). Nonparametric Propensity Score Matching Method, which is adopted in this research, is the one of the latest method to evaluate treatment effect. The word of average in "average treatment effect" implies that the estimated treatment effect by Nonparametric Propensity Score
Matching Method does not depend on individual conditions, but depend on the average of overall distribution of individuals. mining in industry (current) in the industry and those firms with over 1000 employees in firm size. Change in firm size is 3 if firm size in the current job is larger than in the previous job, 2 if firm size in the current job is the same as in the previous job, and 0 otherwise.
Change in position is 3 if position in the current job is higher than in the previous job, 2
if position in the current job is the same as in the previous job, and 0 otherwise. 
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